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Abstract
The Republican leadership in the U.S. Congress
pursued aggressive strategies of partisan discipline
from 1994-2006, during which they held the majority
of seats in the House of Representatives. Anecdotally,
the Republican leadership built tight donor networks,
demanding and rewarding partisan loyalty from rank
and file elected officials. This paper uses Social
Network Analysis to explore the structure of those
relationships over time and compare them to the
Democrats. Specifically, I examine campaign
donations from and between leadership political action
committees in the U.S. Congress from 1992-2008.

1. Introduction
Political parties in the United States have never
been considered ideologically cohesive, particularly
when compared to other party systems [2][8][12]. The
primary goal of every legislator is re-election; pursuing
ideological goals do not further reelection as much as
credit-claiming, advertising and position-taking [19].
American legislators create personal re-election
constituencies to insulate themselves from party
pressures [5][17]. Incumbents are particularly wellsuited to protecting themselves from partisan and
electoral pressure [13]. Finally, office-seekers in the
United States must organize and finance their own
campaigns, largely independent of the political parties
– leading to candidate-centered, rather than partycentered campaigns [17]. Political parties are
instrumental tools that ambitious politicians use to
achieve goals related to re-election, gaining
institutional power and affecting policy [1].
In effect, members of Congress face a collective
action dilemma. To attain office and remain there, they
must act as individuals. To achieve collective goals,
they must form coalitions. While few mechanisms for
party discipline exist, the promise of campaign funds,
intra-party power and majority status can provide

incentives for legislators to coordinate behavior.
Campaign finance laws regarding political action
committees (PACs) give politicians the opportunity to
advance individual goals of re-election and intra-party
power, as well as the collective goal of majority status,
or control of the institution. In addition, the law allows
elected officials to raise money outside their campaign
organizations via “leadership PACs” to assist other
candidates and organizations [21].
When the Republican party gained majority status
with the 1994 election, its leadership used campaign
finance laws and institutional rules to demand and
reward partisan loyalty, especially under the leadership
of Tom DeLay. While this analysis does not address
questions of causality, it does explore and describe the
changing structure of leadership PAC networks for
both parties from 1992-2008. I find that the
Republicans are first to establish connectivity among
their leadership PACs, while Democrats tend to take
advantage of the larger party structure to distribute
campaign cash. Specifically, the Republicans created a
core-periphery structure, while the Democrats
developed a more balanced network. Finally, some
evidence exists to confirm prior research on member
PAC giving strategies with respect to individual and
collective aspirations.

2. Why give?
Running for federal office is expensive. The high
cost of elections and historical evidence of corruption
led to the regulation of campaign finances in federal
elections, including the U.S. House and Senate. Much
of the law revolves around regulating contributions and
expenditures and providing transparency through
disclosure laws. Many organizations, including banks,
corporations and labor unions, are prohibited from
donating directly to campaigns; they are permitted to
so via separate entities called political action
committees (PACs). PACs must be funded separately
from the general treasury through voluntary
contributions. Finally, PACs are limited in the amount

Figure 1. Leadership PAC growth
they can spend on candidates, political parties, and one
another [9][21].
Leadership (or member) PACs are a subset of
political action committees, governed by the same
campaign finance laws governing traditional PACs.
Instead of being affiliated with business, labor or civic
organizations, elected officials (and former ones)
create and chair these committees, which are legally
distinct entities from their respective campaign
committees and the political parties. The widespread
use of leadership PACs is a relatively recent
institutional development [16][26]. Since the early
1990s, the number of member PACs exploded,
reaching 458 in 2008 (Figure 1). Republican officials
led the way in creating these committees, consistently
outpacing Democratic politicians.
Member PACs may distribute their wealth to
many different types of organizations, not just
candidates. In fact, a committee could make a direct
contribution to a candidate (up to $10,000 per two-year
electoral cycle), to the national party (up to $30,000
per cycle), the state party ($5000) and any other PACs
($5000 each, annually), on top of what the candidate
committee can contribute [21]. Leadership PACs
provide a way for redistributing fundraising wealth
from safe, well-funded legislators to challengers and
competitive races [10][11][25].
Academic research on PACs spending and
influence is divided on the actual purpose of cash and
its influence on policy outcomes; most ascertain that
contributions either buy policy influence or political
access, with about half the literature concluding
contributions have no direct influence [3][18].
Influence or access may not be a direct goal of a PAC
contribution. More accurately, a PAC contribution
helps maintain (re-elect) or expand (support
challengers) a favorable coalition of legislators with
similar policy preferences. Prior research suggests that
leadership PACs are strategic, supporting quality
challengers and vulnerable incumbents. Members
owning these PACs may have both collective and

individual goals in mind when distributing funds
[11][25].
The primary goal of all members of Congress is
reelection, followed by power within the institution
and good public policy; they are able achieve these
goals through credit-claiming, advertising and
position-taking [19] and taking advantage of the perks
of in being office to establish a personal, as opposed to
partisan, connection with their voters [5][13].
Achieving stature within the institution, such as
advancing in the leadership or committee structures of
Congress can advance these goals. In addition,
legislators build alliances to pass legislation that helps
their individual districts. Thus, members of Congress
contribute from their leadership PACs to improve their
individual standing within their respective party and
within the chamber as a whole. In doing so, they
enhance individual electoral prospects. Legislators
desiring advancement should contribute to the party
leaders who then redistribute funds to the races where
most needed. Members who want to build alliances
will be more likely to contribute to other member
PACs, regardless of the rank of the member. While the
leadership PAC retains direct control when donating to
a candidate, it looks magnanimous and expansive when
it donates to the other entities.
Collective goals, such as achieving majority
control and passing programmatic legislation, require
coordination among individuals. Parties evolved within
the Congress to maintain more or less permanent
coalitions of individuals who share similar preferences.
One way for a party to improve cohesion is to elect
more politicians who share party objectives. More
specifically, prior research argues that party leaders
tend to sponsor the largest committees, play a role in
targeting races and exhorting their members to do the
same [26]. The leadership of each party may use
leadership PACs to enforce party discipline, forge
coalitions and reward good behavior. Thus, collective
goals of the parties would include maintenance,
expansion, and party-building. Thus, we would expect
party leadership to contribute their funds to targeted
races that would help maintain or gain control and to
serve as brokers, connecting those with funds to those
in need.
Individual goals are intertwined with collective
goals of majority power and control of the chamber.
Majority status confers additional perks including
setting the agenda and committee chairmanships both
of which can be tailored to fit constituent needs and
achieve policy goals [13]. Simply, majority status, a
collective goal, helps politicians achieve individual
goals related to advancement.
Campaign finance law, together with collective
and individual needs of legislators, creates the

possibility for networks to develop, reflecting the flow
of resources from one fundraiser to another. Naturally,
some members can afford to be expansive – or
generous – particularly those with safe seats, national
reputations, or existing leadership status. Others will
endeavor to create funding ties with one another in
support of future legislative or electoral goals, such as
presidential ambitions. The party organizations
themselves will likely serve as conduits, redistributing
funds where needed.

3. Methods and data
Elected officials own leadership PACs. They have
control over the funds raised and distributed. While
they may be pressured from the legally separate
political party organizations (i.e., the Republican or
Democratic National Committees), financial decisions
remain within the member PAC, not the party. Elected
officials use leadership PACs to raise money separate
from their campaign committees; successful
fundraising may raise a member’s prestige or status,
help increase a party’s seat share, and could be used
enforce party discipline. However, contributions do not
always flow from a member committee directly to a
candidate. A member PAC may give to another
leadership PAC or another political organization,
including parties, ideological PACs and businessrelated PACs, who may then be in a position to
redistribute the funds.
Social Network Analysis (SNA) allows one to
examine the relationships between actors. SNA enables
one to uncover who the prominent actors may be, how
entities are connected with one another and relative
power within a particular context. Moreover, SNA also
allows one to understand the structure of those
relationships – or the overall context of the
relationships. Campaign contributions are a classic
form of transaction relation, where the cash from one
member to another constitutes a valued, directed tie. In
addition, the contribution also communicates
information about both the giver and the receiver.
Thus, SNA is an appropriate technique to understand
the structure of giving within leadership PACs in
Congress and can improve our understanding of
relationships in Congress, as they are explicitly
modeled. Here, I make use of the valued and directed
properties that contributions inherently communicate.
Federal elections for the House and Senate are
governed by a two-year cycle corresponding to the
elections that occur for Congress. Thus, the election
occurring in 1992 would include the year prior as part
of its cycle (e.g., 1991-92 is the 1992 cycle). I examine
leadership PAC contribution patterns for each cycle

from 1992-2008, or nine cycles. The total cash
contributions from one member PAC to another PAC
in a single two-year cycle creates the tie for a single
election; the combination of those ties between the
varying member PACs creates the network for that
cycle. I use the total dollar amount from one committee
to another in a cycle rather than the number of
contributions to weight the edges, under the
assumption that receiving more money is more
important and constitutes a stronger relationship. The
ties are directed, indicated that the donor chose the
recipient, which has meaning in terms of collective and
individual goals.
Leadership PACs give almost exclusively to
fellow partisans. Thus, each party is examined
independently. Moreover, the networks do not
necessarily contain the same set of actors over time,
reflecting electoral fortunes of politicians, this makes
true dynamic modeling problematic [22][23]. The data
come from the Center for Responsive Politics’ bulk or
“open data” for PAC to PAC contributions [7]. I first
examine within-member PAC giving. I then examine
leadership PAC giving to other political action
committees and the national, state and local parties.

4. Sharing the cash among themselves
How do leadership PACs share funds with each
other? Examining within-leadership committee
contributions can illustrate the structure of
relationships, including who, if anyone is influential,
and how well the leadership PACs are connected.
Having a leadership PACs may signify a desire for
higher office, staying an incumbent, or passage of
policy priorities – individualistic goals related to
advancement. Sharing hard earned cash from your
leadership committee, or developing exchange
relationships with other leadership committees,
requires overcoming the collective action problem.
Individuals must move beyond individualist aims to
advance collective goals of majority status. Thus,
members may pursue goals of advancement and
alliances, but may also pursue maintenance, expansion
and party-building activity. The network of withinmember PAC giving can highlight these relationships,
particularly those of advancement.
In this section, I examine the digraphs from 1992
to 2008 for both partys’ Congressional leadership
PACs. Circles indicate House members, squares
indicate Senators. The sizes of the nodes indicate
betweenness centrality. Betweenness centrality is
important in the context of PAC giving, as
betweenness allows one to assess the location of actors
and their roles. An actor with high betweenness

Figure 2. Democratic leadership PACs 2004

Figure 3. Republican leadership PACs 2002

centrality has more influence over the flow of money
in the network, connecting disparate elements of the
network [15]. I use spring-embedding with geodesic
distances to configure the digraphs. In the figures
below, I do not show the edge weights to improve
readability. Interestingly, neither party exhibits much
in the way of ties or structure early. The most
connected networks occur for the Republicans in the
early 2000s, at the height of Republican fundraising
prowess.

party building. Pelosi’s presence from 2002-2006
presage her rise to leadership within House Democratic
ranks; she won the Speakership, the highest office with
the House, in 2007. More often than not, she is
distributing, contributions consistent with ambition.
In 2008, two of the three actors with the most
betweenness centrality are Senators with presidential
aspirations (Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden). In
addition, both contenders for the Democratic
Presidential nomination are recipients, not donors. The
ties related to presidential hopefuls indicate a different
type of strategy than discussed above, suggesting more
theorizing about inter-institutional ambition. For
example, if a legislator wanted to run for higher office,
such as the presidency, then she would want to build a
coalition of support prior to doing so. Giving money to
colleagues, or being expansionist for some time prior
to a presidential bid, would build support for this
ambition that could be called upon during the election.
This is not evident in any of the within member PAC
networks for Senator Hillary Clinton. In all cases, she
attracts contributions from her fellow members,
suggesting support for her potential bid already exists.
It is also evidence of her ability to raise funds even as a
newcomer to the Senate. By 2003 she had already
surpassed President Bill Clinton as the Democratic
Party’s leading fundraiser [6]. Giving to prominent
presidential hopefuls might be considered the ultimate
in party-building behavior: it helps capture a different
institution for the party.

4.1. Democrats and presidential ambition
The Democratic leadership PACs networks are
slow to organize. The first four networks (92, 94, 96,
98) average 2.5 actors and 1.5 ties; no exchanges take
place in 1994. The last four cycles (02, 04, 06, 08)
average 32 actors and 26.5 ties. The networks are
small, to be sure, but much more developed in more
recent electoral cycles.
Not until the 2004 election does any real connectivity
occur within the Democratic committee network
(Figure 2). This network consists of both House and
Senate member PACs, with Tom Daschle, Nancy
Pelosi and Patrick Kennedy anchoring a small, simple
network. Interestingly, the direction of ties suggests
that House members are assisting Senators in 2004.
Daschle, the highest ranking Democrat in the Senate
has an equal number of ties in either direction. This
would be consistent with the idea that party leaders
funnel money to those most in electoral need or with
collective goals of attaining or protecting majority
status.
In 2002, Representative Pelosi served as Minority
Leader, or leader of the opposition party in the House
(then Democratic). In that cycle, she contributes to
other House members with relative safe seats, potential
evidence of alliance-building, individual goals.
However, since this network only consists of other
incumbents with leadership PACs, I cannot rule out

4.2. Republicans coordinate, then collapse
The Republicans are much quicker to begin the
flow of money across leadership PACs and exhibit
much more cohesiveness in the digraphs. Prior to 2000,
the Republican graphs are quite similar to the
Democrats, though larger: from 1992-1998, each
network averages 8.75 actors and 5.75 ties. This period
coincides with the Republicans gaining control of both

Figure 4. Republican leadership PACs 2006

Figure 5. Republican leadership PACs 2008

chambers of the U.S. Congress, and attempting to
maintain party discipline (1995-98). The networks for
the last four electoral cycles are much larger than prior
periods or than any of the Democratic networks,
averaging 85.75 actors and 118.75 ties from 20022008.
Like the Democrats, the early cycles consist
mainly of small, disconnected groups. It is not until
2000 that any connectivity between separate
components of these early networks appears. In
addition, the Republican leadership PAC network is at
its height only from 2000-2006. The member PAC
network exhibits fragmentation in 2006, which is much
more apparent in 2008. In 2008, when the Republicans
no longer controlled either the House or the Senate, the
size of their network was nearly half what it was in
2006, with a third the number of ties. This could reflect
any number of things: the loss seats, and consequent
loss of majority, the splintering of relationships within
the Republican Party, or a change of financial strategy
within the leadership.
The Republican network for 2002 reveals
interesting patterns (Figure 3). Two former legislators
have high betweenness centrality (Livingston and
Paxon). This gives them positional advantage, in that
they can help resources flow from one part of the
network to another. Former members often maintain
their Leadership PACs for some time after leaving
office. As neither individual has individual electoral or
advancement ambitions within Congress, they are
clearly pursuing collective goals, including expansion
and party-building. In particular, Livingston could
afford to be expansionist: he retired in early 1999.
The 2006 electoral cycle, which cost the
Republicans majority status in both chambers, reveals
the beginning of what appears to be separation by
chamber (Figure 4), Senators McConnell and Stevens
anchor the Senate side, while Representative Blunt
exhibits the highest betweenness centrality on the
House (left) side. This would indicate the possibility
that these legislators were engaging in party-building

and a rear guard strategy – to protect majority status
within each chamber. However, rather than
coordinating across chambers as in the past, the giving
within leadership PACs is more within chamber,
perhaps to serve collective goals of maintaining
control.
Evidence for both collective and individual goals
is present. Neither McConnell nor Stevens was up for
re-election, thus could afford to be generous. For most
of the electoral cycle, the Republicans were expected
to maintain control of the Senate. McConnell would
have benefited as he was expected to become the
leader of the Senate had that happened. Nearly all of
his ties are as contributor, which would lend support to
both individual and collective strategies as winning the
majority would serve advancement well. As an
established leader, he would know which races to
target to keep that majority. Roy Blunt exemplifies
collective pursuits, as he stepped down from his
leadership post in early 2006. Regardless, he exhibits
the highest betweenness centrality within the House. In
this case, while he does take in contributions, he
primarily distributed funds to other leadership PACs.
Another significant node, Oxley, also lends itself to
collective goals, as Oxley did not run for re-election in
2006. All of Oxley’s ties are as a giver, thus playing an
expansionist role, attempting to keep the Republicans
in power on the House side.
The 2008 Republican Leadership PAC network
shows fragmentation (Figure 5), with several distinct
components, consisting primarily of dyads or triads.
The two largest components generally reflect the two
chambers, House and Senate. McConnell and Lott play
a role in linking various actors on the Senate
component (right side, figure 5). On the House side,
the primary players appear to be Tom Feeney and Eric
Cantor. Feeney was defeated in his re-election bid; the
Democratic Party campaigned heavily to defeat him.
Closer inspection of the digraph reveals that he is
prominent: his leadership PAC was primarily a
recipient from his colleagues, who presumably were

Figure 6. DLP PAC giving 1992

Figure 7. RLP PAC giving 1992

trying to save his election. On the other hand, Cantor is
expansive, giving to other candidates, either for
individual goals (advancement) or to regain majority
status. In this case, he is an example of someone who
would benefit from pursuing both individual goals
(advancement within the leadership structure) and
collective goals (achieving majority status). If the
Republicans had regained control of the House of
Representatives, his leadership position, he gained
immediately following the election would be much
more consequential.

types of goals.
This section examines the full population of
leadership committees giving to other political
committees in 1992, 2000 and 2008. Many member
PACs do not contribute to one another but do form
financial ties with political parties and other
organizations. The networks from the previous section
are embedded in these networks. Leadership PACs are
indicated with triangles, party organizations with
diamonds, and all other PACs with circles. Again, I use
spring-embedding to visualize the six networks. Node
size is set to betweenness centrality in order to better
evaluate a member PAC’s role in the network with
respect to the flow of money. I first discuss and
compare the structure of the networks as a whole
before turning to a discussion of individual roles within
that structure.

5. Cash flows to other organizations
Leadership PACs also donate to the national, state
and local parties, the campaign arms of the two parties
within Congress as well as other PACs (ideological
and business). A very successful fundraiser can
redistribute his or her success to a colleague, the
parties or other organizations. Giving to other party
committees can be an indicator of both individual and
collective goals. Presumably, giving to your own state
party committee enhances your re-election effort;
giving more generously across multiple states and
organizations may indicate national aspirations; and
giving to the national parties may be indicative of both

Figure 8. DLP PAC giving 2000

5.1. Leadership PAC giving over time
Several interesting trends are apparent. More
leadership PACs form relationships over time with
other PACs. The Democratic leadership PAC network
consists of 43 actors/ 48 ties in 1992 and 223
actors/501 ties in 2008. The Republican member PAC
network is similar, ranging from 52 actors/43 ties to

Figure 9. RLP PAC giving 2000

Figure 10. DLP PAC giving 2008

Figure 11. RLP PAC giving 2008

402 nodes/644 ties for the same years. Democratic
member PACs link to political organizations earlier
than Republicans, creating a balanced network over
time. The Republicans approximate a core-periphery
structure.
In 1992, the central players for both Republicans
and Democrats are established leaders within
Congress, who primarily distribute funds to other
PACs (Figures 6 and 7). The Democratic leadership
link to their political party organizations through
donations to them, acting expansively. Thus, leaders
within the Democratic Party are sharing their largesse
with organizations that can better target races. This is
reflective of a maintaining or an expansion strategy, or
strategies to keep or attain majority. The Republican
leadership network also appears to be acting
expansively, consistent with collective goals. However,
the 1992 Republican network is sparse, consisting of
several small components; two of these are of star
configurations consisting solely of donations to other
committees.
The pattern of coordinating with the party
organizations becomes much more evident in 2000 and
2008 for both parties (Figures 8-11). In addition, the
graphs for both parties clearly show more actors,
reflecting the increased use of leadership PACs more
generally (Figure 1). Finally, the Democratic
leadership networks appear to exhibit more
connectivity or coordination in both 2000 and 2008
(Figures 8 and 10) than their Republican counterparts
(Figures 9 and 11). The Republican leadership
networks give the impression of multiple coreperiphery structures, particularly in 2008, which may
be consistent with hierarchical leadership. It may also
indicate that this network is more fragile, especially if
one of the more central players retires.
The
Republicans appear to have a small number of key
actors who control the flow of money, which would be
consistent with collective goals of majority-building
and party discipline within the institution.
The

Democratic network has more channels for the money
to flow perhaps allowing for ambition.
Some basic network statistics for the overall
networks are presented in Table 1. All six networks are
sparse, as measured by network density. Network
density is simply the proportion of all possible ties that
are actually present. While there are far more actors
present in these networks and over time, legislators are
very selective in whom they choose for a contribution.
While the Democratic member PACs consistently
make more ties within their network, the largest
percentage of ties they make is in 1992, at 2.6% of
possible links. This does suggests that leadership PACs
use donations strategically, as they do not appear to
make indiscriminant connections.
Table 1. Network density and centralization
1992

2000

2008

R

D

R

D

R

D

Outdegree

.443

.241

.203

.192

.194

.153

In-degree

.024

.143

.139

.117

.186

.189

Density

.016

.026

.007

.013

.004

.010

Nodes

52

43

188

109

402

223

Ties

43

48

230

164

644

501

Measures of network centralization provide insight
into the overall structure of each network and allows
for comparison across networks. A highly centralized
network is dominated by a few actors, which could
easily fragment into unconnected subgroups; less
centralized networks are much more resilient. Here, I
use Freeman’s approach to calculate both in-degree
and out-degree centralization for directed ties. In
addition, I dichotomized the values to ease
interpretation; scores can be expressed as percentages.
Centralization scores indicate the degree of asymmetry
in contributions. High in-degree centralization would
indicate that a small number of actors receive
contributions (either to save their election or to re-

distribute). A high out-degree score would indicate that
a small number of actors distribute funds or control the
flow of money.
First, out-degree centralization, which is higher for
the Republican leadership networks, decreases for both
parties. It is an indicator of the increased use of
member PACs by more actors in attempting to affect
outcomes. It could also be an indicator of individual
goals by building a loyal base among members,
circumventing the parties. The change over time is
most dramatic for the Republicans, moving from 44%
in 1992 to half that amount in 2008. The Democratic
networks also decline from 24% to 15%. In both
cases, the out-degree scores indicate much more stable
networks, less likely to completely fragment, but also
that a fair amount of autonomy occurs within the
networks by 2008 in terms of giving cash, consistent
with individual goals.
All the networks have lower in-degree
centralization scores, with the exception of the
Democrats in 2008, whose in-degree score is 3.6%
higher than the out-degree score for 2008, and 7.24%
greater than the in-degree score in 2000. This could
reflect increased fundraising prowess over time from
the Democratic leadership network once the Democrats
regained control of both the House and Senate in 2007.
The Republican leadership network increases from
2.35% in 13.86% in 2000 and 18.6% in 2008. In all
cases, for both parties, a greater number of PACs are
recipients over time.

5. 2.Centrality and reach
Measures of centrality are useful for assessing
important actors are relative to one another. Degree
centrality scores in directed networks provide
information about how prominent, prestigious or
expansive that actor is. Betweenness centrality scores
are used to assess an actor’s location in the network
and control over the flow of resources [15][24]. High
in-degree centrality signifies that the individual is
prestigious, or a recipient of donations. This could be
because that actor is in trouble electorally, or in a
position to redistribute funds to other individuals in
need.
High
out-degree
centrality
indicates
expansiveness, or individuals who are generous with
their cash flow. Finally, high betweenness suggests that
that actor is important to connecting various parts of
the network and insuring that resources flow.
Table 2 presents information on who gives and
receives for 2000 and 2008. Two types of centrality are
presented: degree and betweenness (normalized, using
Freeman’s approach). For both parties, the most
prominent recipients are the campaign arms of each
chamber. These campaign organizations, headed up by
rising stars in each chamber, indicate fundraising
prowess in terms of acquiring cash. This is consistent
with attracting funds to target important races, hence to
support collective goals. Members give to these
organizations as they can make the best strategic use of
the contribution.
Not surprisingly, the actors with the highest

Table 2. Normalized Freeman degree and betweeness centrality for selected observations
Republicans
Indegree
Outdegree
Betweenness
Democrats
Indegree

Outdegree

Betweenness

2000
National Rep. Congressional Cmte.
National Rep. Senatorial Cmte.
Americans for Rep. Majority (DeLay)
New Republican Majority Fund (Lott)
Americans for Rep. Majority (DeLay)
Bayou Leader PAC (Tauzin)
2000
Dem. Congressional Campaign Cmte.
Dem. Senatorial Campaign Cmte.
Democratic National Committee
District 20 FL (Deutsch)
PAC for a Change (Boxer)
DASHPAC (Daschle)
Leadership of Today & Tomorrow
(Becerra)
PAC for a Change (Boxer)
America Works (S. Brown)

14.44
6.42
20.88
1.26
0.111
0.076
12.96
12.04
10.19
20.37
16.67
10.19
10.19
0.151
0.043

2008
National Rep. Congressional Cmte.
National Rep. Senatorial Cmte.
Freedom Fund (Crapo)
Freedom Project (Boehner)
Freedom Project (Boehner)
Growth & Prosperity (Bachus)

18.95
10.72
19.70
17.21
0.201
0.050

2008
Dem. Senatorial Campaign Cmte.
Dem. Cong. Campaign Cmte.

19.82
18.02

AmeriPAC (Hoyer)
HILLPAC (Clinton)
Searchlight Leadership Fund (Reid)
National Leadership (Rangel)

16.22
11.71
9.46
9.01

HILLPAC (Clinton)
BRIDGE PAC (Clyburn)
Unite Our States (Biden)

0.452
0.112
0.09

centrality (out-degree or betweenness) are generally
those already in a position of power with Congress and
not vulnerable electorally. They can afford generosity
– expansiveness. They can also target races to achieve
the collective goals of party discipline (reward
loyalists) and party building. Crapo at first appears
odd, until one recognizes that he never faces a real
challenge to re-election in Idaho. As a safe incumbent,
he is free to pursue collective goals along with the
party leaders and former leaders (Lott) though
individual ambition cannot be ruled out.
Regarding ambition, some interest points are
relevant for the Democrats. The most expansive
legislator in 2000 is Peter Deutsch (FL), who often ran
unopposed for re-election. He did have ambition for
higher office, running for the Democratic nomination
for Senate unsuccessfully in 2004. Interestingly,
Clinton’s committee has both high out-degree
centrality in the 2008 cycle and betweenness centrality,
reflecting both her fundraising prowess and her
presidential ambitions. Whereas she was a recipient in
the member-PAC only network, here she also has
donor propensity, particularly to state party
organizations.
To further understanding of leadership PAC
giving, I studied the ego networks, or neighborhoods,
of several key member PACs. I focused on the outneighborhoods – or all the ties from an ego, or focal
member PAC, to others political organizations, their
alters. The focus of the analysis is on the 2008 data
presented in Table 3 and the concept of reach.
The concept of reach speaks to the ability of the
ego to connect to the entire network. This is yet
another way to think about the influence of key
players. Specifically, two-step reach, or the percentage
of all actors in the entire network the ego can reach in
“two-steps”, for our top leadership PACs shows some
variance among the egos. Despite the fact that several
of our leader PACs involve party leaders and
Table 3. Selected "neighborhoods", 2008
Size

Density

2 Reach h

Crapo (R, Senate)

79

0.00

32.42

Boehner (R, House)

69

0.04

49.63

Hoyer (D, House)

36

0.00

60.81

Clinton (D, Senate)

26

0.00

47.3

Rangel (D, House)

20

3.16

51.8

McConnell (R, Senate)

15

4.29

16.71

Bachus (R, House)

15

3.33

41.15

Nadler (D, House)

15

3.33

34.23

Lott (R, Senate)

12

3.79

34.16

presidential aspirants, only two house Democrats
(Hoyer and Rangel) and one house Republican
(Boehner) can reach a majority of the actors in their
networks. This is can be thought of as the ability of the
contribution to have a trickle down affect, as someone
like Hoyer can reach 60% of the network through a
“friend of a friend”, while others, such as McConnell
can only reach 17% of the Republican network in this
manner. In 2008, then, some Democratic leaders were
better able to serve the entire network than the
Republicans.

6. Conclusions
The rational choice perspective of individual goal
directed behavior fits American political behavior well.
Over time, legislators created institutions to overcome
the inherent collective action problems prevalent in our
legislative and electoral systems. But even these
institutions, such as political parties, must overcome
the candidate-centered nature of federal elections. The
campaign finance system provides an additional
institutional mechanism – leadership PACs – that can
help achieve both individual and collective goals.
Members can be expansive or generous and
simultaneously achieve goals of re-election,
advancement and party building.
From this study, several things are clear. First,
when studying the within-member PAC networks, the
Republicans were faster to organize and share cash
with one another. Within-PAC giving could highlight
individual goals, particularly those of advancement and
alliance building. Second, when examining the larger
context of leadership PAC to PAC giving, the
Democrats make more use of their extant party
structure, coordinating with them earlier and more
often than the Republicans. This would have the effect
of strengthening the party structure over time.
Some confirmatory evidence for contribution
strategies exists. Individuals with safe seats, not
running or who have retired appear to be expansionist,
consistent with collective, party-building goals.
Members in party leadership positions within
Congress, having already achieved advancement,
follow strategies to maintain or expand the coalition.
While it is impossible to distinguish individual and
collective strategies for other members in this data, it is
possible that they are pursuing both simultaneously.
Last, while advancement strategies would suggest that
individuals would give more to colleagues [10], this is
not the case when it comes to Clinton. Most of her
donations went to garner support in among the rank
and file, laying the grounds for a primary run,

suggesting a different strategy when it comes to
winning a different institution
This exploratory analysis does not test the
hypotheses posed about behavior, as it only examines
cash flows from leadership PACs to one another and to
other PACs, not candidates. However, studying the
network of financial ties is a first step in evaluating the
structure Congressional relationships. If structure in the
social network perspective is viewed as enduring
patterns of relations, then simple cross-sectional
analyses of dynamic processes miss the evolution or
changes within the context of decision-making.
Network analysis is useful here in elucidating the
endogenous nature of campaign finance. Another
benefit of network analysis over most statistical
methods is that actors are explicitly modeled as
interdependent. Future research must disentangle
whether politicians create the network, or if the
network determines their behavior. Any quantitative
analysis must take into account the embedded nature of
the observations when conducting hypothesis testing
and causal analysis [4][14].
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